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Abstract. We show how to speed up the discrete log computations on
curves having automorphisms of large order, thus generalizing the attacks
on anomalous binary elliptic curves. This includes the rst known attack
on most of the hyperelliptic curves described in the literature.
1 Introduction
The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was rst suggested by Miller [28] and
Koblitz [19], following the work of Lenstra on integer factorization [23]. Many
people improved on these ideas and the domain is ourishing. (See for instance
the many books on that topic, e.g. [18, 27].) Koblitz [20] was the rst to suggest
using hyperelliptic curves for the same goal.
The security of many cryptosystems based on curves relies on the diculty of
the discrete log problem. In some special cases, it was shown that this problem
was rather easy [26], [11], [44], [38], [40]. Apart from new lifting ideas [43, 17, 7,
6, 15] that remain to be tested, it seems that the discrete log on elliptic curves
still resists. On ordinary curves, the only known attack is a parallelized version
of Pollard's rho method [50]. The Certicom challenge
1
records the state of the
art in the eld.
Among the curves suggested for cryptographic use, the so-called Anomalous
Binary Curves (ABC curves) have been shown to be somewhat less secure than
ordinary curves, due to the existence of an automorphism of large order. Two
types of attack have been suggested [52], [13]. The rst one can be seen as an
additive rho method, the second one as a multiplicative method.
?
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The purpose of this article is to point out that these attacks can be gen-
eralized to the case where there exists an automorphim on the curve (resp. on
the Jacobian of an hyperelliptic curve). In particular, we show how to obtain a
speedup of
p
m if there is an automorphism of order m.
The organization of the article is as follows. First of all, we recall Pollard's
algorithm and its additive and multiplicative variants. Then, we describe the
use of equivalence classes as originated in [52, 13]. In particular, we show how
to tackle the problem of useless cycles in the Wiener-Zuccherato approach, by
analyzing the number of useless cycles and being able to throw them out. We
then show how to use automorphisms of large order on (hyper)elliptic curves,
including generalized ABC curves [30, 45] and curves with CM by Z[
p
 1] or
Z[(1 +
p
 3)=2], for which this appears to be the rst published attack. This
method applies also to hyperelliptic curves that were presented by Koblitz and
others. We support our approach by numerical simulations.
2 Parallel collision search
Let G be a nite abelian group with law written additively  (and multiplication
by k denoted by [k]P ) and P an element of order n of G (w.l.o.g. we will assume
that n is prime using the Pohlig-Hellman approach [33]). Let Q be an element
of < P >, the cyclic group generated by P . The discrete log problem refers to
the search for  s.t. Q = []P . For instance, G can be the group of points of an
elliptic curve over a nite eld, or the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve.
Generically, there exist three methods for computing discrete logs in time
O(
p
n): Shanks's method [41], Pollard's rho and lambda methods [34], the last
one being better when one has to nd the discrete logarithm in a reduced range
(that is not over [0; n[). The rst method also uses O(
p
n) space, which is gen-
erally a problem. After recalling Pollard's rho, we show how a parallel collision
search method can be described in the same spirit.
2.1 Pollard's rho method
It is well known that if we collect approximately k random values from a set of
cardinality n, then we will nd two equal values if k =
p
n=2 on average. To
solve the memory problem, Pollard [34] suggested to iterate a random function
f on the group < P >. Starting from a point R
0
2< P >, for instance R
0
=
[u
0
]P  [v
0
]Q with u
0
and v
0
random integers (modulo n), one computes
R
i+1
= f(R
i
)
thereby obtaining two sequences (u
i
) and (v
i
) modulo n such that:
R
i
= [u
i
]P  [v
i
]Q:
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Fig. 1. The rho shape of (R
i
).
In order to understand the properties of this random sequence, one is led to
study the functional graph of f , that is the graph built using all starting points
R 2< P >, as shown in Figure 1.
Such a sequence consists in a tail of length  and a cycle of length , thus
forming a rho of size  =  + . Asymptotic values for the critical parameters
of this graph are given in [10]. For instance, a graph with n vertices should have
0:5 logn (connected) components, the average tail (resp. cycle) length should be
p
n=8, thus giving a rho length of about
p
n=2.
These results imply that after about
p
n=2 iterations, we will nd a collision,
that is two integers i and j for which R
i
= R
j
. This will give an identity
[u
i
  u
j
]P  [v
i
  v
j
]Q = 0
from which we can deduce  if v
i
6 v
j
mod n, which happens with probability
1   1=n: Indeed, each element R of < P > has n dierent representations as
[u]P  [v]Q and the values v
i
and v
j
are supposed to be random integers in
[0; n  1].
2.2 Using distinguished points
An ecient implementation of parallel collision search requires storing a limited
number of points that have a distinguished property (this idea was used for the
rst time in [35]). If  is the proportion of distinguished points, then we should
nd a collision after computing about
p
n=2 points, or 
p
n=2 distinguished
points. Now, parallelization is straightforward: have each processor contribute
to the same list of distinguished points [50]. Each processor would have to nd

p
n=2=M points, thus yielding a speedup of M to the total running time.
To understand how a parallelized search works, consider gure 2, on which
we have drawn two paths, the one corresponding to processor i and the second to
processor j. Their paths collide at point C, which lies between the distinguished
points D
1
and D
3
(resp. D
2
and D
3
). The collision will be discovered as soon as
we nd that R = D
3
.
Such a random walk has a very important feature: it is deterministic, which
means that if f(R) = C, then f(f(R)) = f(C), so that after hitting C from any
direction, one follows a single path afterwards.
2.3 Choosing the function f
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Fig. 2. The deterministic property.
An additive random walk. One way of choosing a good random function
consists in precomputing r random points (T
(j)
)
0j<r
in < P >, with T
(j)
=
[u
(j)
]P  [v
(j)
]Q and to dene the random walk as
f(R) = R T
(j)
where j = H(R) with H a hash function sending < P > to f0; 1; : : : ; r 1g. This
creates an additive random walk in Z=nZ since each point R
i
can be written as
R
i
= [u
i
]P  [v
i
]Q for which
u
i+1
 u
i
+ u
(j)
mod n; v
i+1
 v
i
+ v
(j)
mod n:
Satler and Schnorr [39] have shown that the above approach is suciently
random if r  8. Teske has found experimentally [49] that a value of r  20 is
more convenient.
A multiplicative random walk. One can also use a function f built with
xed multipliers (
j
)
0j<r
, 
j
dened modulo n. We dene:
f(R) = [
j
]R
where j = H(R) as above. In this version, we would in fact compute:
f(R) =
2
4
r 1
Y
j=0

f
j
j
3
5
R
0
:
A collision with a single sequence would not be interesting since this would lead
to (
Q
j

f
j
j
)  1 mod n. A collision is interesting if it comes from two distinct
sequences: two initial values R
0
= [u
0
]P  [v
0
]Q and R
0
0
= [u
0
0
]P  [v
0
0
]Q would
lead to a more useful [
Q
j

f
j
j
]([u
0
]P  [v
0
]Q) = [u
0
0
]P  [v
0
0
]Q. For this to be
random enough, we must have r large as above. To be ecient, the method
requires that the multiples be eciently computed.
Mixed walks. In practice, it would be fruitful to mix both strategies. This
would lead to a walk that is dicult to analyze in theory but which is likely to
be \more random".
3 Random mappings on equivalence classes
Let  be an equivalence relation on < P > for which there are n=m equivalence
classes. We note R for the equivalence class of R. If we can iterate Pollard's rho
on the set of equivalence classes < P > = , then we should nd a collision in
time
p
n=(2m) instead of
p
n=2.
The easiest way of building an equivalence class is by using automorphisms
of the group G. Wiener and Zuccherato [52] considered the case where G is the
set of points of an elliptic curve E dened over a nite eld K . In that case, the
equivalence relation would be S  T if and only if T =  S. The rst known
nontrivial example of such a phenomenon came from ABC curves [52, 13] (see
section 3.3 below).
More generally, if we know an automorphism  of order m operating on G,
we can use the equivalence relation:
S  T () 9i; S = [
i
]T
and hope to get a speedup of
p
m. We will give new examples in the following
section.
From now on, we suppose our equivalence class is built on an automorphism
 of order m. For the method to work eciently, the equivalence class of a point
should be easy to compute, that is much faster than an addition in G.
3.1 Well dened mappings
The rst thing we can think of is to iterate f as usual, but perform the matches
on the equivalence classes only. Starting from a random point R in < P >, we
iterate R = f(R); if R = R
j
for some j, try to nd a match and stop, otherwise,
store R.
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Fig. 3. Paths that cross each other.
This looks ne, as long as we do not want to parallelize the algorithm. In that
case, we can come across the diagram of gure 3 which shows that the random
walk would no longer be deterministic. For instance, imagine that we are again
in the case of elliptic curves with an additive walk and that:
R
i+1
= R
i
+ T
(k)
= (x; y);
Sj+1
= S
j
+ T
(`)
= (x; y):
In that case S
j+1
= R
i+1
, but in general f(S
j+1
) 6= f(R
i+1
).
Therefore, we must nd a function f dened over < P > and that is well
dened over the equivalence classes. More precisely, we want that if R
0
2 R, then
f(R
0
) = f(R). The most obvious approach is to use R
i+1
= f(R
i
) and we iterate
R = f(R) until a collision is found.
3.2 Useless cycles for additive walks
Let us explain why useless cycles appear. Suppose that G is the set E(K ) of
points on an elliptic curve E over the nite eld K = F
p
n
. Suppose we use a
function f as in section 2.3. Assume that the representative of a class is the point
(x; y) with least y. Then we could encounter a situation where starting from R
i
,
we nd
R
i+1
= R
i
 T
(j)
= 	R
i
	 T
(j)
:
It could happen that
R
i+2
= R
i+1
 T
(j)
(the same j), thus yielding
R
i+2
= 	R
i
	 T
(j)
 T
(j)
= R
i
:
This proves the existence of useless 2-cycles.
We x some notations for studying these cycles. We consider a (primitive)
t-cycle consisting of points R
1
; R
2
; : : : ; R
t
; R
t+1
= R
1
. We denote by j
k
the value
H(R
k
) of the hash function and we denote by "
k
= 
e
k
the automorphism which
gives the representative of the equivalence class of R
k
 T
(j
k
)
. Thus we have
R
k+1
= ["
k
](R
k
 T
(j
k
)
). See gure 4 for a description of the cycle.
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Fig. 4. A typical useless t-cycle.
We can now derive an expression of R
t+1
in terms of R
1
and our parameters
j
k
and "
k
:
[1="
t
]R
t+1
= ["
t 1
   "
1
]R
1
 
with  = ["
t 1
   "
1
]T
(j
1
)
 ["
t 1
   "
2
]T
(j
2
)
     ["
t 1
]T
(j
t 1
)
 T
(j
t
)
. We
have a useless t-cycle if  = 0. Indeed, when "
1
; : : : ; "
t 1
and j
1
; : : : ; j
t
are
chosen such that  = 0, then R
t+1
is in the class of R
1
, which does not impose
any restriction on "
t
. The fact that the T
(j)
are randomly chosen implies that
(very likely) there is no simple relation between them
2
. In that case, a necessary
condition for having  = 0 is that for all k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; tg there exists a l 6= k
such that j
k
= j
l
.
Now, we can summarize the following results on the expected number of
useless t-cycles.
Proposition 31 Suppose there is an automorphism  of order m acting on a
group G with n elements and that the T
(j)
are not related by relations involving
powers of . We can estimate the probability P(t) of useless t-cycles for small
t when iterating an additive function with r branches (the expected number of
t-cycles being P(t)(n=m=t)).
We have
P(t) 
min(r;t=2)
X
k=1
1
m
k
min

1;
r!k
t
(r   k)!r
t

:
Moreover, for small values of t we have the following bounds:
t pattern P(t)
2 j
1
= j
2
1=(mr)
3  2=(mr)
2
3 j m
0 3 - m
4 j
1
= j
2
= j
3
= j
4
 (1  1=m)
2
=(mr
3
)
j
1
= j
3
; j
2
= j
4
(1  1=r)=(mr)
2
The proof of this proposition is given as an appendix. This proposition shows
that when t and r are large enough, the probability to nd a t-cycle is very small,
and we likely do not encounter one.
Taking care of useless cycles. Using Proposition 31, it is clear that an easy
way of solving the problem is to force a large value of r, which is not really a
problem in practice. In the rare cases where a cycle appears, we can get out of it
by collapsing it as suggested in [13]. If the cycle is R
1
7! R
2
7!    7! R
t
, we want
to get out of it in a symmetric way, that is reach the same point, whichever R
i
was the point at which we entered the cycle. Our version is to sort the points R
i
to obtain S
1
, S
2
, : : :, S
t
and start again, say, from R =
L
t
i=1
[i
i
+1]S
i
. Anything
that breaks linearity would be convenient.
From a practical point of view, we count the number of distinguished points
we obtain along the path. If this number does not evolve as prescribed by the
theory, that is 1 among 1= points, then we decide to inspect the cycle and check
out if it comes from a useless one or not. The more frequent case of 2-cycles can
be handled with a look-ahead technique (see [52]) that is somewhat simpler.
2
If there is one, then we have found the discrete log!
3.3 A multiplicative random walk
Let us explain the situation for ABC curves [22]. In this case, K = F
2
`
and E
is dened over F
2
. Then  : (x; y) 7! (x
2
; y
2
) is an automorphism of order `. If
` is odd
3
, the equivalence relation is: S  T () 9i; S = [
i
]T with m = 2`
classes. This relation has been exploited in [13] and [52] as well as in real life
computations by R. Harley (see http://www.certicom.com/chal/).
Gallant et al. have suggested to use a multiplicative random walk with a
function f dened by f(R) = [
R
]R, where 
R
is a multiplier depending on the
class of R. This walk is well dened, since f commutes with :
f(R
0
) = [
R
0
]R
0
= [
R
]R
0
= [
R
]([
i
]R) = [
i
]([
R
]R) 2 f(R):
In order to make the method ecient, the multiples must be computed very
quickly. In that case, 
R
is taken to be 1 + 
H(R)
where H is a hash-function
sending the equivalence classes to f0; 1; : : : ;m  1g. As noted in section 2.3, the
number of such multipliers should be large. For the CM examples given below
this will prove not to be the case.
4 Finding new examples
Our idea is to nd new examples of curves with non-trivial automorphisms. We
will concentrate on algebraic curves dened over nite elds of characteristic p.
We will rst summarize the results concerning the number of automorphisms of
(the Jacobian of) a curve.
4.1 Theoretical results
For g = 1, we know that we can obtain automorphisms of order 4 or 6 for
some CM curves (details for both cases follow in Section 4.2) and powers of the
Frobenius for ABC curves [22].
We obtain examples for g > 1 by considering CM hyperelliptic curves and
curves dened over nite elds xed by powers of the Frobenius, as well as curves
dened over Q having non-trivial automorphisms.
For genus g > 1, we need a priori distinguish between automorphisms of a
curve and automorphisms of its Jacobian. Automorphisms of a curve naturally
dene automorphisms on its Jacobian. By Torelli's theorem [29], all automor-
phisms of the Jacobian (for a xed projective embedding and a chosen zero
element) arise in this way (except for multiplication by minus one on the Jaco-
bian of non-hyperelliptic curves). And we may identify the automorphisms of a
curve and those of its Jacobian.
If g > 1, the number of geometric automorphisms (not considering powers
of the Frobenius) does not exceed 84(g   1) provided that p > g + 1, with the
exception of the curve y
2
= x
p
 x (see [36]). Without the restriction p > g+1, the
3
If ` is even, we obtain a relation with ` classes only.
upper bound becomes 16g
4
, with again a single explicit exception: y
q
 y = x
q+1
or a quotient thereof, for q a power of p (see [48]). Under the assumption that
the Jacobian has maximal p-rank g, the upper bound 84g(g   1) holds [32].
The exceptions are of no interest to us as the Jacobians of these curves con-
tain no large cyclic components. To some extent this occurs more generally for
curves with many automorphisms. Automorphisms induce invariant subgroups
in the Jacobian. When these subgroups are non-trivial for many dierent auto-
morphisms, the Jacobian does not admit cyclic components of large prime order.
For such a large component would itself have invariant subgroups. It follows that
the selection of curves with automorphisms suitable for cryptosystems requires
some care. For the decomposition of a Jacobian with given automorphism group,
see [1, 16].
Examples of curves with automorphisms that have large cyclic components
in their Jacobian are the curves y
2
= x
p
  x + 1 in odd characteristic p [9].
The automorphism x 7! x + 1 of prime order p induces as invariant subgroup
the trivial group and the Jacobian itself is often of prime order. Other examples
are described in Section 4.3. In this paper we will always consider that the
automorphism on the Jacobian can be restricted to an automorphism of the
cyclic subgroup we are working in. This will be the case for all practical examples
where the group is almost prime. Indeed, assume that we are dealing with a cyclic
subgroup of prime cardinality n generated by P . Then n
2
does not divide the
cardinality of the whole group, and the only elements of order n in the group are
precisely those which constitute the subgroup < P >. Then the image of P by
the automorphism is a of order n, and is in < P >, and the subgroup is stable
under the action of the automorphism.
4.2 New examples with elliptic curves
We can nd the proofs for what follows in [42, Chapter 2]. It is well known that
the only elliptic curves having non-trivial automorphisms (over Q ) have CM by
Z[i] (resp. Z[]) where i
2
=  1 (resp. 
3
= 1). They are: E
a;0
: Y
2
= X
3
+ aX
for a 6= 0 and E
0;b
: Y
2
= X
3
+ b with b 6= 0. On E
a;0
, multiplication by i is
an automorphism sending a point (x; y) to ( x; iy); on E
0;b
,  sends (x; y) to
(x; y).
Over Q, this is all the story, an elliptic curve having in general automorphism
group f1g. Over nite elds, Frobenius automorphisms enter the game as seen
with ABC curves. It is easy to see how to generalize the automorphism attack
to curves suggested by Muller [30] and Smart [45].
The reductions of the curves E
a;0
and E
0;b
are supersingular for p = 2; 3, so
that we will consider them interesting only in the case p > 3. For the sake of
simplicity, we suppose that K = F
p
, p odd prime > 3.
The case E
a;0
. We suppose that a 6 0 mod p and p  1 mod 4 (if p  3 mod
4, then E
a;0
is supersingular and the MOV reduction applies [26]). Again, we
suppose that we are looking for a discrete log on the group < P > with prime
order n. Let I
2
p
  1 mod p and I
2
n
=  1 mod n such that [I
n
](x; y) = ( x; I
p
y)
(this is possible since p and n are  1 mod 4 by the theory of reduction of CM
curves). Then the automorphism is (x; y) = [I
n
](x; y) and the class of R = (x; y)
consists of f(x; y); ( x; I
p
y); (x; y); ( x; I
p
y)g. We decide that R is the point
with minimal ordinate in absolute value.
The \obvious" choice would be to use a generalization of the ABC approach
and use 
R
= 1 + 
H(R)
where H sends the classes to f0; 1; 2; 3g. However, this
does not work, due to the fact that 
2
=  1 and (1 + )(1  ) = 2. A random
walk would compute multiples of the form (1+)
u
(1 )
v
which is not random
enough (compare with [39]). Using other multiples would be too costly.
So, we must use the additive random walk, with the modications described
in the preceding section. This gives us a speed up of
p
4 = 2. In the case of F
p
`
(` odd), we can use the Frobenius (x; y) 7! (x
p
; y
p
) to obtain a speedup of
p
4`.
The case E
0;b
. We suppose b 6 0 mod p and p  1 mod 3 (the case p 
2 mod 3 yields a supersingular curve). We let 
p
(resp. 
n
) denote a primitive
third root of unity modulo p (resp. modulo n) such that [
n
](x; y) = (
p
x; y).
The automorphism is (x; y) = [ 
n
](x; y) and the class of R = (x; y) consists of
f(x;y); (
p
x;y); (
2
p
x;y)g. We take the representative with smallest x and
smallest y.
Here again, the multiplicative choice using multipliers of the form (1+
i
) is
disastrous due to the fact that 1+
2
=   and 1+ =  
2
and we come back
to the additive version, thus yielding a speedup of
p
6 and more generally
p
6`
over F
p
` , ` odd.
4.3 Examples of hyperelliptic curves
We will consider curves of equation Y
2
= F (X) = X
2g+1
+    when p > 2
(resp. Y
2
+ H(X)Y = F (X) = X
2g+1
+    for p = 2) where g > 1 is the
genus of the curve. There is no group law on the curve, but there is one on
its Jacobian, noted Jac(C). The only result we need says that every element
of Jac(C) can be uniquely represented by a so-called reduced divisor with at
most g points. For more precise statements about those things, one can refer
to Mumford [31]. In [4] (see also [20]), Cantor gives an algorithm for computing
with the reduced divisors: we can add them in polynomial time. We do not recall
his method here, but we give the representation of a reduced divisor: it is a pair
of polynomials [u(z); v(z)], where u is monic of degree at most g and greater than
the degree of v. The opposite of such a reduced divisor (for the Jacobian group
law) is just the divisor represented by [u(z); v(z)]. The hyperelliptic involution
is [u(z); v(z)] 7! [u(z); v(z)].
From a practical point of view, it is not as easy to compute the cardinality
of a Jacobian over nite elds as it is for elliptic curves using the so-called SEA
algorithm [25, 24]. So various researchers have suggested some special form of
curves for which this computation is easy [21], [9], [5], [46], [37], [3].
Automorphisms. We suppose  is an automorphism on the curve of the form
 : (x; y) 7! (
1
(x); 
2
(y)). We restrict ourself to the study of two classes of
automorphisms: in case 1, the coordinate-functions 
1
and 
2
are identical and
are also automorphisms (a typical example is the Frobenius action), and in case
2, 
1
and 
2
are multiplication maps in the nite eld (this occurs for CM
curves).
In both cases the automorphism can be extended to the Jacobian of the
curve, and we still denote  the extended automorphism. With the polynomial
representation of reduced divisors, we can derive simple expressions for the action
of : for h  g, we have
 : [z
h
+ u
h 1
z
h 1
+   + u
0
; v
h 1
z
h 1
+   + v
0
]
7! [z
h
+ 
1
(u
h 1
)z
h 1
+   + 
1
(u
0
); 
1
(v
h 1
)z
h 1
+   + 
1
(v
0
)]
for case 1, and
 : [z
h
+ u
h 1
z
h 1
+   + u
0
; v
h 1
z
h 1
+   + v
0
]
7! [z
h
+ 
1
u
h 1
z
h 1
+   + 
h
1
u
0
; 
2

 (h 1)
1
v
h 1
z
h 1
+   + 
2
v
0
]
for case 2.
Thus, provided that the computation of the action of 
1
and 
2
is easy we
can obtain the image of a divisor quite quickly.
Examples. In the literature we nd many examples of hyperelliptic curves
which come with an automorphism. Some of them are obvious (such as Frobenius
endomorphism), but some others were probably not known to the authors (see
the curve of Sakai and Sakurai [37]). We summarize in table 1 some examples for
which we give the non-trivial automorphisms, and the order m that we obtain
when combining them together with the hyperelliptic involution.
Author Equation of curve Field Automorphisms m
Koblitz [20], [21] Y
2
+ Y = X
5
+X
3
() F
2
n
Frob +

X 7! X + 1
Y 7! Y +X
2
4n
Y
2
+ Y = X
5
+X
3
+X () F
2
n
Frobenius 2n
Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
+X F
2
n
Frobenius 2n
Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
F
2
n
Frobenius 2n
Buhler Koblitz [3] Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
(y) F
p
with mult. by 
2g+1
2(2g + 1)
Chao et al. [5] (and twists) p  1 (2g + 1)
Sakai Sakurai [37] Y
2
+ Y = X
13
+X
11
+ F
2
29
Frobenius & 4 29
X
9
+X
5
+ 1 (y)
8
<
:
X 7! X + 1
Y 7! Y +X
6
+X
5
+X
4
+X
3
+X
2
Duursma & Y
2
= X
p
 X + 1 (y) F
p
n
Frobenius & 2np
Sakurai [9] (X; Y ) 7! (X + 1; Y )
Table 1. Examples of curves
The curves marked by () can be broken by the reduction method of [11]
which is much faster than the  method, even with the use of automorphisms.
For high genus curves in the examples marked by (y), a faster attack is given by
the index-calculus method of [2].
For each curve in the table, we can improve the parallel collision search by
a factor
p
m. For example, if one wants to break the cryptosystem proposed by
Sakai and Sakurai, which uses a divisor of prime order around 2
171
, we have
to perform about 2
86
operations on the Jacobian, and using the Frobenius, the
involution and the new automorphism, we have only to perform about 2
82
op-
erations. Note that the authors took into account the use of Frobenius in their
evaluation of the security, but not the other automorphism (however it still does
not break the system).
The curve Y
2
= X
5
  1 and generalizations. The Jacobian of the curve
Y
2
= X
5
  1 admits complex multiplication by the eld Q(
5
) where 
5
is a
5-th root of unity. Combining it with the hyperelliptic involution, we obtain an
automorphism of order 10. The formulae for the action on reduced divisors are:
 : [z
2
+ u
1
z + u
0
; v
1
z + v
0
] 7! [z
2
+ 
5
u
1
z + 
2
5
u
0
;  
 1
5
v
1
z   v
0
]
[z + u
0
; v
0
] 7! [z + 
5
u
0
; v
0
]
0 7! 0:
This case may be generalized to the curves of equations Y
2
= X
2g+1
  1 (or
Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
as suggested in [3]), which admit complex multiplication by
the ring of integers of Q(
2g+1
), providing an automorphism of order 2g+1 (and
even 4g + 2 combined with the trivial involution).
In this case, we could also dream of using a multiplicative random walk with
multipliers 1 + 
i
. However, we have to be careful, due to the many algebraic
relations between 5-th roots of unity. Apart from 1  + 
2
  
3
+ 
4
= 0, we
have among others 1 + 
5
= 0, (1 + 
2
)(1 + 
4
) = 
3
, (1 + 
4
)(1 + 
8
) = ,
(1+
6
)(1+
8
) =  
2
, (1+
3
)(1+
8
) = 1+, etc. If during the random walk
we do a couple of consecutive steps corresponding to one of these relations, then
we obtain a cycle of length 2 which is useless. So, we come back to the additive
one to get our speedup of
p
10.
5 Numerical experimentations
In order to validate our ndings, we made several experiments on random graphs
of reasonable size as well as some real discrete log computations on small exam-
ples. The hash function used was H((x; y)) = y mod r in each case. All examples
were done using the computer algebra system MAGMA.
5.1 Elliptic examples
We built functional graphs for the case of E : Y
2
= X
3
+2X over K = F
1000037
.
We chose P = (301864; 331917) of prime order n = 500153. We made two series
of experiments on 50 random mappings with r branches. The following table
contains the number of useless t-cycles found:
r #2  cycles #4  cycles
20 772(781) 5(5)
1000 16(15) 0(0)
These values are close to those prescribed by Proposition 31 that are given in
parentheses.
We did the same for the curve E : Y
2
= X
3
+ 2 over K = F
1000381
on which
P = (1; 696906) is a point of prime order n = 998839. Again we tried 50 random
walks.
r #2  cycles #4  cycles #3  cycles
20 694(693) 7(7) 2(3)
1000 13(14) 0(0) 0(0)
We also did 100 real discrete log computations for the curves given be-
low. We give the average gain obtained, that is the ratio 
p
n=2 divided by
the number of distinguished points computed. For E : Y
2
= X
3
+ 2X over
F
10000003021
with P = (9166669436; 170163551) of prime order n = 5000068261,
Q = (1314815213; 7654067643) (with  = 2153613198), we got a speed up of
1:88 for r = 20 (resp. 1:82 for r = 1000) and for E : Y
2
= X
3
+ 2 over
F
10000000963
, P = (2; 5825971627), n = 9999804109, Q = (4; 6715313768) (thus
 = 8959085671), we got 2:23 for r = 1000.
5.2 Hyperelliptic examples
We built the functional graphs of 50 random mappings for the Jacobian of the
curve Y
2
= X
5
 1 over K = F
31
3
, which has a divisor of prime order n = 778201.
We found 201 components on average, with 196 2-cycles and 0.8 4-cycles, which
is closed to the expected theoretical values (194 and 0.7).
We did the same for the rst example given by Koblitz in [20]: the curve is
Y
2
+ Y = X
5
+X
3
+X over K = F
2
11
, with a divisor of order n = 599479. We
tried 50 dierent pseudo-random walks obtaining on average 31:5 2-cycles (the
theory predicts 30:9), and almost no 4-cycles (0:07 expected). With the modied
walk, we have 5:6 components on average (5:1 for pure random walk).
We also did some experiments of discrete log computations. For each of the
curves, we did 1000 tests, the r parameter was xed to 50. The rst curve was
Y
2
= X
5
 1 over F
31
7
, with a divisor of order n = 1440181261.We got an average
gain of 3:13 for the number of iterations (to be compared with
p
10  3:16). The
second test was done for the curve Y
2
+ Y = X
5
+ X
3
+ X over F
2
37
, with a
divisor of order n = 319020217. The average gain obtained was 8:83 (theory says
p
74  8:60).
6 Conclusions
We have described a general framework speeding up discrete logarithm compu-
tations on curves with large automorphism groups, including in particular some
elliptic and hyperelliptic curves with complex multiplication. One could raise
the question to nd curves having automorphisms which are not of Frobenius or
CM type.
Note that for high genus hyperelliptic curves, we can speed up the Adleman{
DeMarrais{Huang discrete log algorithm [2] using all these automorphisms (see
[14]). This suggests that the use of such curves in cryptosystems requires great
care.
For the genus > 2, most of the curves in the literature for which the car-
dinality of the Jacobian can be computed have a non-trivial automorphism. It
would be interesting to build new curves having no automorphisms. For genus 2,
examples are given by the CM construction of Spallek [46], see also [51]. See also
[47] for some examples of high genus random curves and [12] for superelliptic
curves.
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A Proof of Proposition 31
Remember that  is an automorphism of order m and that we use an additive
function with r branches.
A.1 2-cycles
How many useless 2-cycles do we expect? We rst evaluate the probability for
a random point R
1
to be in a useless 2-cycle. Let R
2
be the point computed
by the pseudo-random walk, and j
1
= H(R
1
). We have R
2
= R
1
 T
(j
1
)
. The
useless cycle can be produced when the class of R
1
 T
(j
1
)
is 	R
1
	 T
(j
1
)
,
which occurs with probability 1=m. If this rst condition is satised, the cycle
is produced when H(R
2
) equals j
1
, which occurs with probability 1=r. Finally,
the probability for a point to be in a useless 2-cycle is 1=(rm).
A.2 3-cycles
For 3-cycles, the expression of  is
 = ["
1
"
2
R
1
+ "
1
"
2
]T
(j
1
)
 ["
2
]T
(j
2
)
 T
(j
3
)
:
The condition on the j
k
's implies that j
1
= j
2
= j
3
. Then  = 0 = ["
1
"
2
+ "
2
+
1]T
(j
1
)
, and we have "
2
(1 + "
1
) =  1. We study "true" 3-cycles, so we do not
want R
3
= R
1
, so we can suppose "
1
6=  1. Then "
2
=  1=(1 + "
1
).
If we suppose that the automorphism  is a root of unity
4
, the last equation
gives j1 + "
1
j = j"
1
j = 1, and then "
1
is a third root of unity. Thus, if the order
m of  is not a multiple of 3, we cannot have a useless 3-cycle; otherwise we can
give an upper bound for the probability for a point to be in a useless 3-cycle by
2=(mr)
2
("
1
can take 2 values, and then "
2
is unique).
A.3 4-cycles
We have three dierent patterns for the j
k
's.
First case: j
1
= j
2
= j
3
= j
4
. Then we have  = ["
1
"
2
"
3
+ "
2
"
3
+ "
3
+1]T
(j
1
)
,
and we have a cycle if
"
3
=  
1
1 + "
2
(1 + "
1
)
:
The properties "
1
6=  1 and "
2
6=  1=(1 + "
1
) are necessary to have a true 4-
cycle, and guarantee that the expression makes sense. However, for some values
of "
1
and "
2
, there is no "
3
satisfying this equation. For example, if 
4
= 1, then
the only triples of solutions are ("
1
; "
2
; "
3
) = (; ; ) or ( ; ; ).
We can bound the probability of a 4-cycle with this pattern. The probability
that the j
k
's are equal is 1=r
3
; the probability that "
1
6=  1 is 1   1=m, the
probability that "
2
6=  1 and "
2
6=  1=(1 + "
1
) is bounded by (1   1=m),
and nally we have at most one choice for "
3
, i.e. probability 1=m. Finally, the
probability for a point to belong to such a 4-cycle is less than (1  1=m)
2
=mr
3
.
Second case: j
1
= j
2
and j
3
= j
4
.We want to have a true 4-cycle, so R
1
6= R
3
,
which implies that "
1
6=  1. In that case, the equation  = 0 becomes
["
2
"
3
(1 + "
1
)]T
(j
1
)
 [1 + "
3
]T
(j
3
)
= 0;
with T
(j
1
)
6= T
(j
3
)
, so this equation has no solution with "
1
6=  1 if the points
T
(j)
are suciently randomly chosen. Hence such a pattern cannot occur with
signicant probability.
The same result holds for the case: j
1
= j
4
and j
2
= j
3
.
Third case: j
1
= j
3
and j
2
= j
4
. In that case, the equation  = 0 becomes
["
3
("
1
"
2
+ 1)]T
(j
1
)
 ["
2
"
3
+ 1]T
(j
2
)
= 0; which reduces to the system

"
1
"
2
=  1;
"
2
"
3
=  1;
or "
3
= "
1
=  1="
2
. If we assume that the automorphism is a root of unity, then
for any given "
1
, there is a unique solution of the system for "
2
and "
3
.
The probability that j
1
= j
3
is 1=r, idem for j
2
= j
3
, and moreover we impose
j
1
6= j
2
, which occurs with probability (1   1=r); the probability of nding the
good values for "
2
and "
3
is 1=m
2
. Finally the probability for a point to belong
in a 4-cycle with such a pattern is (1  1=r)=(rm)
2
;
Putting together these results, we can bound the probability for a point to
be in a useless 4-cycle by (1  1=r)=(rm)
2
+ (1  1=m)
2
=mr
3
.
4
This is always the case for an automorphism of a cyclic group.
A.4 The case of t-cycles
For a t-cycle, we rewrite the cancellation of  as a system of k equations, one
for each j
i
which actually occurs. We evaluate the probability of ( = 0) for
every value of k, and then collect the results. Note that k has to be at most t=2,
because there has to be at least two terms in each equation, and of course k is
at most r. Now let S be the set of the j
i
which actually occur in  . Then
Pr( = 0) =
min(r;t=2)
X
k=1
Pr( = 0 j#S = k):Pr(#S = k):
First step: Pr(#S = k)  min(
r!k
t
(r k)!r
t
; 1).
This problem can be expressed as follows: what is the probability to get
exactly k distinct elements, when one takes randomly t elements in a set of r
elements (we put the element back in the set after each step). This probability
is classically (see [8])
 
r
k

S
2
(t; k)=r
t
, where S
2
(t; k) is the Stirling number of the
second kind. Then we bound S
2
(t; k) by k!k
t
, and obtain the formula.
Second step: Pr( = 0 j#S = k).
Let us make the change of variables
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
"

1
= "
t 1
   "
1
"

2
= "
t 1
   "
2
.
.
.
"

t 1
= "
t 1
This transformation is invertible since the "
i
are invertible. The expression for 
becomes  = ["
t 1
   "
1
]T
(j
1
)
  T
(j
t
)
= ["

1
]T
(j
1
)
  ["

t 1
]T
(j
t 1
)
T
(j
t
)
=
L
k
l=1
[E
l
]T
(j
i
l
)
, where the E
l
are linear expressions in the "

i
. When the "

i
are
randomly chosen among m values, for each l the probability that E
l
is veried
is bounded by 1=m. Thus the probability to have a good (t   1)-uple of "
i
is
bounded by 1=m
k
, and the result follows.
Note that we used the fact that we have a true t-cycle, because we supposed
that the "
i
were randomly chosen, which is not the case if for example we have
a 2-cycle ("
2
has an imposed value in that case).
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